• As these theories were refined, however, some foundationalists began to admit that even basic beliefs could be fallible, and that derived beliefs could mutually support each
    other; whereas some coherentists began to admit that experiential beliefs should be weighted so as to reflect realistic degrees of coherence or justification.

  • It is possible to include the relevance of experience for the justification of empirical beliefs, as experientialist foundationalism does but coherentism does not, and at
    the same time, instead of requiring a privileged class of basic beliefs, to allow for pervasive mutual dependence among beliefs, as coherentism does but foundationalism does not.

  • Moreover, those foundationalists who wondered why there couldn’t be mutual support between basic and derived beliefs were in danger of falling into coherentism.

  • [4] Haack introduces the analogy of the crossword puzzle to serve as a way of understanding how there can be mutual support among beliefs (as there is mutual support among
    crossword entries) without vicious circularity.

  • [1][2] In principle, foundationalism holds that basic beliefs unilaterally support derived beliefs, with support always directed from the former to the latter; coherentism
    holds that beliefs mutually support each other when they belong to the same coherent belief-set.


Works Cited

[‘1. Haack, Susan (1993), Evidence and Inquiry (Evidence and inquiry ed.), Oxford, UK: Blackwell, ISBN 0-631-11851-9, OL 1398949M, 0631118519
2. ^ Aune, B. (1996). “Haack’s Evidence and Inquiry”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 56 (3):
627–632. doi:10.2307/2108389. JSTOR 2108389.
3. ^ BonJour, L., Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), pp. 177–202.
4. ^ Russell, Bertrand (1912). Problems of Philosophy.
5. ^ Haack,
Susan (2014). Evidence Matters: Science, Proof, and Truth in the Law.
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