islamic fundamentalism in iran

 

  • It was the first step to found a constitution based on Islamic rules (see: Political Islam) Iran was the first country in the post-World War II era in which political Islam
    was the rallying cry for a successful revolution, followed by the new state formally adopting political Islam as its ruling ideology.

  • reject explanations of “Islamic fundamentalism” as an anti-imperialist political force directed against Western dominance in the Islamic world, others, such as Moaddel, argue
    that Islam has been politicized only during the second half of the twentieth century as a discourse of opposition, not to Western domination in the state system, but to the ideas, practices, and arbitrary political interventions of a westernizing
    secularist political elite.

  • [24] Viewpoints[edit] In 2006, a cleric with no University education was appointed as the head of Tehran University, Iran’s symbol of modern scientific and secular institutions
    There is a lot that is unique about Iranian fundamentalism but it nonetheless must be seen as one of the Abrahamic revivalisms of the twentieth century.

  • Combatant Clergy Association[edit] The association is composed of right wing conservative elements of Iran’s political culture, including the nation’s foremost politicized
    clerics, the Friday prayer leaders in most of Iran’s metropolitan areas, the bazaar merchants, and the Supreme Leader.

  • “[36] In another speech Ali Khamenei compared what he called “American fundamentalism” and “Islamic fundamentalism”: “We can see that in the world today there are nations
    with constitutions going back 200 to 300 years.

  • [5] Iranian fundamentalists and conservatives, commonly describe themselves as “principalist” (also spelled principlist); that is, acting politically based on Islamic and
    revolutionary principles.

  • [28] Political Islam consists of a broad array of mass movements in the Muslim world, which share a conviction that political power is an essential instrument for constructing
    a God-fearing society.

  • [8] Subsequently, religious fundamentalism in Iran has several aspects that make it different from Islamic fundamentalism in other parts of the world.

  • [62] Exporting Islamic Revolution and Islamist diplomacy Upon establishment of Islamic Republic, the two factions (conservatives and radicals) differed on foreign policy and
    cultural issues.

  • We must consider as insiders those persons who are sympathetic towards our revolution, our state and Islam.

  • “[36] He also made a clear distinction between what he called “extremism” and “fundamentalism”: ” There may be a handful of extremists here and there, but all the elements
    serving in various departments of our country are fundamentalists in essence.

  • [25] As in the course of the Persian Constitutional Revolution nearly a century earlier, the concept of justice was at the centre of the ideological debates among the followers
    of the three Islamic orientations during and after the revolution.

  • Ramin, Hassan Abbasi, Abbas Salimi Namin and others have been giving speeches about Jewish conspiracy theory, Iranian and western history intensively all over the country
    since the establishment of Ahmadinejad government in 2005.

  • [63] Beyond these theoretical debates, elements of the “Islamic Administration” are (in practice) slowly replacing those of the “Islamic Republic”.

  • Many of the religious remarks that are made in Iran, especially from official platforms, basically rest on identity-oriented thinking and the inculcation of an identity known
    as a religious identity.

  • [40] Currently, Abadgaran described itself as a group of Islamic neo-principalist,[45] have the control over current Iranian government.

  • [22] In May 2005, Ali Khamenei defined the reformist principle-ism (Osoulgaraiee eslah-talabaaneh) of his Islamic state in opposition to the perceived hostility of the West:
    “While adhering to and preserving our basic principles, we should try to constantly rectify and improve our methods.

  • According to Gary Legenhausen: “The term Islamic Fundamentalism is one that has been invented by Western journalists by analogy with Christian Fundamentalism.

  • [64] In January 2007, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani who won the 2006 election for Assembly of Experts, clearly rejected this idea and emphasized on the fact that the leader and
    the cleric members of the Assembly of Experts may make wrong decisions and the legitimacy of the leader comes from the people not the God.

  • He believed in the “separation” of religion from politics, even though he was Khomeini’s senior in rank.

  • [20] Hassan Rahimpour Azghandi offers the following apologia for the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism: “It should be made clear that if fundamentalism or terrorism exist,
    they are a reaction to the colonial militarism of the West in the Islamic world, from the 18th century until today.

  • [46] Under Ahmadinejad, neo-conservative forces are determined to make the Islamic Republic more Islamic than republican.

  • states, anti-Western attitude in other parts of the Muslim world has a different root than the one in Iran.

  • [49] It was founded in 1977 by a group of clerics with intentions to use cultural approach to overthrow the Shah.

  • The new faction was named “Faction of creative principalists” which is said to be critical of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s neo-principalist policies and to reject conservatism on
    such matters related to the government.

  • Some researchers, categorized Iranian thinkers into five classes:[14] • Anti-religious intellectuals • Religious intellectuals • Traditionists • Traditionalists • Fundamentalists
    Traditionists who account for the majority of clerics keep themselves away from modernity and neither accept nor criticize it.

  • [63] Neo-fundamentalists believe that the supreme leader is holy and infallible and the role of people and elections are merely to discover the leader.

  • They advocated active support for Islamic and liberation movements, so called “export of the revolution”, throughout the world.

  • [17] Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri and Navvab Safavi were among the pioneers of religious fundamentalism in Iran and today serve as the Islamic Republic’s foremost heroes and role
    models.

  • Important constituents of the Militant Clergy Society include the Islamic Coalition Society and the Coalition of Followers of the Line of the Imam.

  • [14] As an example of different views on fundamentalism, one can refer to Ruhollah Khomeini who is considered as populist,[15] fundamentalist and reformer by various observers.

  • Moreover, fundamentalists believe that for reviving the religion in the modern era and for opposing modernity, they need to gain social and political power.

  • However, Iran adopted an “alternative” human rights declaration, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, in 1990 (one year after Khomeini’s death).

  • [57][58] On the other hand, fundamentalists and in-system reformers on one side and neo-fundamentalists on the other side are struggling over “Khomeini’s Islamic Republic”
    versus “Mesbah’s Islamic administration.”

  • However, with the emergence of Communism in Iran, anti-Western attitudes were taken up by some extremists.

  • But U.S. officials define reformism as opposition to Islam and the Islamic system.

  • [16] Emergence The birth of fundamentalist Islam in Iran is attributed to the early 20th century, almost a century after secular humanism and its associated art and science
    entered Iran.

  • Today, Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi clearly rejects Khomeini’s “Islamic Republic” and supports the idea of “Islamic government” where the votes of people has no value.

  • [55] Theories of state based on divine legitimacy Various theories of state based on immediate divine legitimacy have been proposed over the years by Iranian clerics.

  • Not surprisingly, members of this faction support a continuation of the status quo, including strict limits on personal freedoms and the continued primacy of the clergy in
    the nation’s day-to-day governance.

  • [59][60] They believe the institutions of the Islamic Republic, such as the Majlis (Iran’s Parliament), are contradictory to Islamic government which is completely centered
    around Velayat-e Faqih and total obedience to him.

  • Ali Khamenei, himself, has remained silent on the issue of whether Iran should have an Islamic Republic or an Islamic Administration.

  • For the so call fundamentalists of Islam these are not and never have been the issues.

  • Fundamentalists make up only one part of any religion’s followers, who usually fall along a wide spectrum of different interpretations, beliefs and strong values.

  • Many famous theologians and influential figures in Iran’s politics after the revolution were associated (as teacher or student) with the Haghani Circle or follows its ideology.

  • [65] According to Iranian scholar Ehsan Naraghi, anti-Western attitude among Iranian Islamists has its root in Marxism and Communism rather than Iranian Islam.

  • [66] After the end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988 and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, pragmatists (under the leadership of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani) sought to normalize Iran’s
    relations with other countries, particularly those in the region, by playing down the once-popular adventurist fantasy of “exporting the Islamic revolution” to other Muslim lands.

  • Its goal was to seize state power through an Islamization of all aspects of life in a Muslim society.

  • [37] In particular Mesbah Yazdi is an aggressive defender of the supreme leader’s absolute power, and he has long held that democracy and elections are not compatible with
    Islam.

  • )[35] Another important issue is the concept of “insider-outsider” introduced by Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran.

  • [33] After the triumph of the revolution in February 1979, and the subsequent liquidation of the liberal and secular-leftist groups, two principal ideological camps became
    dominant in Iranian politics, the “conservatives” (fundamentalists) and the “radicals” (neo-fundamentalists).

  • The conservatives favored a more cautious approach to foreign policy, with the ultimate aim of normalizing Iran’s economic relations with the rest of the world, so long as
    the West’s political and cultural influence on the country could be curbed.

  • If people’s religious identity becomes more prominent than the national identity, fundamentalism will rise.

  • [2] The term “Principlists” or Osoulgarayan, is an umbrella term commonly used in Iranian politics to refer to a variety of conservative circles and parties.

  • And finally, those with a liberal orientation to Islam understood the notion of justice in terms of the French revolutionary slogan of egalité, i.e., the equality of all before
    the law.

  • [48] The group’s aim was to transform Iran into an “Islamic state.”

  • According to Bernard Lewis:[4] “In western usage, these words [Revivalism and Fundamentalism] have a rather specific connotation; they suggest a certain type of religiosity-
    emotional indeed sentimental; not intellectual, perhaps even anti-intellectual; and in general apolitical and even anti-political.

  • [26] While the principalists (conservatives) were generally suspicious of modern ideas and resistant to modern lifestyles at the time of the Iranian revolution, the Islamic
    radicals (neo-principalists) were receptive to many aspects of modernity and willing to collaborate with secular intellectuals and political activists.

  • This makes fundamentalists different from traditionists and traditionalists who are not interested in gaining political power.

  • Today, there are basically three types of Islam in Iran: traditionalism, modernism, and a variety of forms of revivalism usually brought together as fundamentalism.

  • Human Rights Watch informs that the Basij belong to the “Parallel institutions” (nahad-e movazi), “the quasi-official organs of repression that have become increasingly open
    in crushing student protests, detaining activists, writers, and journalists in secret prisons, and threatening pro-democracy speakers and audiences at public events.”

  • Human Rights Watch strongly condemned the brutal assault on students at Tehran University halls of residence in the early hours of Friday 9 July 1999 by members of the Ansar-e
    Hezbollah.

  • The whole existence of Pre-Islamic Iran is no more than a Jewish conspiracy and the most important key for analyzing today’s world events is the analysis of ancient “Jewish
    genocide of Purim.

  • Also, even while denouncing modernism as the “Great Satan”, many principalists accept its foundations, especially science and technology.

  • • “General Appointed Mandate of Jurissonsults” (Velayat E Entesabi Ye Ammeh) o Proponents: Molla Ahmad Naraghi, Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Najafi (Saheb Javaher) Ayatollahs Husain
    Borujerdi, Golpayegani, Khomeini, (before the revolution) • “General Appointed Mandate of the Council of the Sources of Imitation” (Velayat E Entesabi Ye Ammeh Ye Shora Ye Marje’eh Taghlid) o Proponents: Ayatollahs: Abdollah Javadi-Amoli,
    Beheshti, Taheri Khorram Abadi • “Absolute Appointed Mandate of Jurisconsult” (Velayat e Entesabi ye Motlaghe ye Faghihan) o Proponent: Ayatollah Khomeini (after revolution) Islamic republic versus Islamic administration[edit] Since the election
    of pro-reform president Mohammad Khatami in 1997, there have been two basic approaches, two outlooks, toward the achievement of reform in Iran: “Reformists” within the regime (in-system reformers) essentially believe that the Constitution
    has the capacity—indeed, the positive potential—to lead the “Revolutionary” government of Iran toward “democracy.”

 

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