socrates

 

  • [17] One common explanation of this inconsistency is that Plato initially tried to accurately represent the historical Socrates, while later in his writings he was happy to
    insert his own views into Socrates’s words.

  • [91] According to Guthrie, Socrates lived in an era when sophists had challenged the meaning of various virtues, questioning their substance; Socrates’s quest for a definition
    was an attempt to clear the atmosphere from their radical skepticism.

  • This is often attributed to Socrates on the basis of a statement in Plato’s Apology, though the same view is repeatedly found elsewhere in Plato’s early writings on Socrates.

  • The Socratic method of questioning, or elenchus, takes shape in dialogue using short questions and answers, epitomized by those Platonic texts in which Socrates and his interlocutors
    examine various aspects of an issue or an abstract meaning, usually relating to one of the virtues, and find themselves at an impasse, completely unable to define what they thought they understood.

  • [122] Plato’s dialogues that support Socrates’s intellectual motivism—as this thesis is named—are mainly the Gorgias (467c–8e, where Socrates discusses the actions of a tyrant
    that do not benefit him) and Meno (77d–8b, where Socrates explains to Meno his view that no one wants bad things, unless they do not know what is good and bad in the first place).

  • [86] According to the first line of thought, known as the constructivist approach, Socrates indeed seeks to refute a claim by this method, and the method helps in reaching
    affirmative statements.

  • [3] The works of Plato, Xenophon, and other authors who use the character of Socrates as an investigative tool, are written in the form of a dialogue between Socrates and
    his interlocutors and provide the main source of information on Socrates’s life and thought.

  • In those accounts, Socrates is portrayed as making no effort to dispute the fact that he did not believe in the Athenian gods.

  • [101] Another explanation is that Socrates holds different interpretations of the meaning of “knowledge”.

  • [119] Another point of debate is whether, according to Socrates, people desire what is in fact good—or, rather, simply what they perceive as good.

  • [123] Scholars have been puzzled by Socrates’s view that akrasia (acting because of one’s irrational passions, contrary to one’s knowledge or beliefs) is impossible.

  • Contradictory accounts of Socrates make a reconstruction of his philosophy nearly impossible, a situation known as the Socratic problem.

  • Vlastos suggests that Socrates is being ironic when he says he has no knowledge (where “knowledge” means a lower form of cognition); while, according to another sense of “knowledge”,
    Socrates is serious when he says he has no knowledge of ethical matters.

  • [128] Whether Socrates was a practicing man of religion or a ‘provocateur atheist’ has been a point of debate since ancient times; his trial included impiety accusations,
    and the controversy hasn’t yet ceased.

  • [102] In any case, there is consensus that Socrates accepts that acknowledging one’s lack of knowledge is the first step towards wisdom.

  • [134] Socrates argued that the gods were inherently wise and just, a perception far from traditional religion at that time.

  • [109] Lesher suggests that although Socrates claimed that he had no knowledge about the nature of virtues, he thought that in some cases, people can know some ethical propositions.

  • Most believe that Socrates left no space for irrational desires, although some claim that Socrates acknowledged the existence of irrational motivations, but denied they play
    a primary role in decision-making.

  • Socrates initiates a discussion about a topic with a known expert on the subject, usually in the company of some young men and boys, and by dialogue proves the expert’s beliefs
    and arguments to be contradictory.

  • [96] Plato’s Socrates often claims that he is aware of his own lack of knowledge, especially when discussing ethical concepts such as arete (i.e., goodness, courage) since
    he does not know the nature of such concepts.

  • Furthermore, Xenophon was biased in his depiction of his former friend and teacher: he believed Socrates was treated unfairly by Athens, and sought to prove his point of view
    rather than to provide an impartial account.

  • [98] In some of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates appears to credit himself with some knowledge, and can even seem strongly opinionated for a man who professes his own ignorance.

  • [85] There have been two main lines of thought regarding this view, depending on whether it is accepted that Socrates is seeking to prove a claim wrong.

  • [15] How trustworthy Plato is in representing the attributes of Socrates is a matter of debate; the view that he did not represent views other than Socrates’s own is not shared
    by many contemporary scholars.

  • However, as the text from Socrates’s trial and other texts reveal, the accusers could have fuelled their rhetoric using events prior to 403 BC.

  • Knowledge, for him, might mean systematic understanding of an ethical subject, on which Socrates firmly rejects any kind of mastery; or might refer to lower-level cognition,
    which Socrates may accept that he possesses.

  • First, Socrates had rejected the anthropomorphism of traditional Greek religion by denying that the gods did bad things like humans do.

  • When Socrates first hears the details of the story, he comments, “It is not, I think, any random person who could do this [prosecute one’s father] correctly, but surely one
    who is already far progressed in wisdom”.

  • [37] In the mid-20th century, philosophers such as Olof Gigon and Eugène Dupréel, based on Joel’s arguments, proposed that the study of Socrates should focus on the various
    versions of his character and beliefs rather than aiming to reconstruct a historical Socrates.

  • The often contradictory stories from these ancient accounts only serve to complicate scholars’ ability to reconstruct Socrates’s true thoughts reliably, a predicament known
    as the Socratic problem.

  • These accounts are written as dialogues, in which Socrates and his interlocutors examine a subject in the style of question and answer; they gave rise to the Socratic dialogue
    literary genre.

  • [50] Although Socrates was attracted to youth, as was common and accepted in ancient Greece, he resisted his passion for young men because, as Plato describes, he was more
    interested in educating their souls.

  • [11] Symposium is a dialogue of Socrates with other prominent Athenians during an after-dinner discussion, but is quite different from Plato’s Symposium: there is no overlap
    in the guest list,[12] In Memorabilia, he defends Socrates from the accusations of corrupting the youth and being against the gods; essentially, it is a collection of various stories gathered together to construct a new apology for Socrates.

  • [100] One explanation is that Socrates is being either ironic or modest for pedagogical purposes: he aims to let his interlocutor to think for himself rather than guide him
    to a prefixed answer to his philosophical questions.

  • [119] Moral intellectualism refers to the prominent role Socrates gave to knowledge.

  • [105] In his debate with Callicles, he says: “…I know well that if you will agree with me on those things which my soul believes, those things will be the very truth…”[105]
    Whether Socrates genuinely thought he lacked knowledge or merely feigned a belief in his own ignorance remains a matter of debate.

  • [93] Some have argued that this priority of definition comes from Plato rather than Socrates.

  • [103] Socrates is known for disavowing knowledge, a claim encapsulated in the saying “I know that I know nothing”.

  • [115] Another line of thought holds that Socrates conceals his philosophical message with irony, making it accessible only to those who can separate the parts of his statements
    which are ironic from those which are not.

  • [33] The Socratic problem In a seminal work titled “The Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher” (1818), the philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher attacked Xenophon’s accounts;
    his attack was widely accepted and gave rise to the Socratic problem.

  • [130] In Alcibiades Socrates links the human soul to divinity, concluding “Then this part of her resembles God, and whoever looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine,
    will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself.

  • [118] Virtue and knowledge are linked, in Socrates’s view, to eudaimonia, but how closely he considered them to be connected is still debated.

  • [57] Trial of Socrates Main article: Trial of Socrates See also: The unexamined life is not worth living In 399 BC, Socrates went on trial for corrupting the minds of the
    youth of Athens, and for impiety.

  • [5] As Aristotle first noted, the extent to which the dialogues portray Socrates authentically is a matter of some debate.

  • Under this understanding, there is a distinction between the Socratic Socrates of Plato’s earlier works and the Platonic Socrates of Plato’s later writings, although the boundary
    between the two seems blurred.

  • [70] In return, Socrates warned jurors and Athenians that criticism of them by his many disciples was inescapable, unless they became good men.

  • [72] Another, more recent, interpretation synthesizes the religious and political theories, arguing that religion and state were not separate in ancient Athens.

  • According to an opinion advanced since the Hellenistic period, Socratic irony is a playful way to get the audience’s attention.

  • [121] In Socratic moral philosophy, priority is given to the intellect as being the way to live a good life; Socrates deemphasizes irrational beliefs or passions.

  • [20] Generally, logoi Sokratikoi cannot help us to reconstruct the historical Socrates even in cases where their narratives overlap, as authors may have influenced each other’s
    accounts.

  • [84] In 1982, the scholar of ancient philosophy Gregory Vlastos claimed that the Socratic method could not be used to establish the truth or falsehood of a proposition.

  • [87] The non-constructivist approach holds that Socrates merely wants to establish the inconsistency between the premises and conclusion of the initial argument.

  • [25] It is not clear whether Aristophanes’s work is useful in reconstructing the historical Socrates.

  • [38] Later, ancient philosophy scholar Gregory Vlastos suggested that the early Socratic dialogues of Plato were more compatible with other evidence for a historical Socrates
    than his later writings, an argument that is based on inconsistencies in Plato’s own evolving depiction of Socrates.

  • [132] Socrates, in Euthyphro, reaches a conclusion which takes him far from the age’s usual practice: he considers sacrifices to the gods to be useless, especially when they
    are driven by the hope of receiving a reward in return.

  • [89] In most cases, Socrates initiates his discourse with an expert on a subject by seeking a definition—by asking, for example, what virtue, goodness, justice, or courage
    is.

  • [104] In other statements, though, he implies or even claims that he does have knowledge.

  • Instead he calls for philosophy and the pursuit of knowledge to be the principal way of worshipping the gods.

  • James H. Lesher has argued that Socrates claimed in various dialogues that one word is linked to one meaning (i.e.

  • One example is when he denies having knowledge.

  • What is certain is that by the age of 45, Socrates had already captured the interest of Athenians as a philosopher.

  • Socrates is known for proclaiming his total ignorance; he used to say that the only thing he was aware of was his ignorance, seeking to imply that the realization of our ignorance
    is the first step in philosophizing.

  • [73] The argument for religious persecution is supported by the fact that Plato’s and Xenophon’s accounts of the trial mostly focus on the charges of impiety.

  • [97] For example, during his trial, with his life at stake, Socrates says: “I thought Evenus a happy man, if he really possesses this art (technē), and teaches for so moderate
    a fee.

  • Against this argument stands the fact that many skeptics and atheist philosophers during this time were not prosecuted.

  • [90] To establish a definition, Socrates first gathers clear examples of a virtue and then seeks to establish what they had in common.

  • Xenophon was a soldier, argued Schleiermacher, and was therefore not well placed to articulate Socratic ideas.

  • He believed that all virtue was based on knowledge (hence Socrates is characterized as a virtue intellectualist).

  • [71] The question of what motivated Athenians to convict Socrates remains controversial among scholars.

 

Works Cited

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27. ^ Vlastos 1991, p. 52; Kahn 1998, pp. 1–2.
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82. ^ Guthrie 1972, pp. 125–127.
83. ^ Jump up to:a b Guthrie 1972, pp. 128–129.
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85. ^ Benson 2011, p. 185;
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88. ^ Ambury 2020, The Elenchus: Socrates
the Refuter: Benson (2011) names in a note scholars that are of constructivist and non-constructivism approach: “Among those “constructivists” willing to do so are Brickhouse and Smith 1994 , ch. 6.1; Burnet 1924 , pp. 136–137; McPherran 1985 ; Rabinowitz
1958 ; Reeve 1989 , ch. 1.10; Taylor 1982 ; and Vlastos 1991 , ch. 6. Those who do not think a Socratic account of piety is implied by the text (“anticonstructivists”) include Allen 1970 , pp. 6–9, 67; and Grote 1865 , pp. 437–57. Beckman 1979 , ch.
2.1; Calef 1995 ; and Versényi 1982″ p=118
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130. ^ Guthrie 1972, pp. 151–153.
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138. ^ McPherran 2013, pp. 272–273.
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155. ^ Obdrzalek
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158. ^ Obdrzalek 2013, p. 231.
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160. ^ D’Angour 2019.
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163. ^ Jump up to:a b Griswold 2011, p. 334.
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168. ^
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173. ^
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174. ^ Guthrie 1972, p. 169.
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186. ^ Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers
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188. ^ Alon 2009, pp. 325–326.
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200. ^ Bowman 2019,
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