information asymmetry

 

  • An example of adverse selection is when people who are high-risk are more likely to buy insurance because the insurance company cannot effectively discriminate against them,
    usually due to lack of information about the particular individual’s risk but also sometimes by force of law or other constraints.

  • As managers with significant power from information may make decision based on their own interest as opposed to the companies.

  • At the same time, lower-level employees are required to make important decisions with only limited information provided to them.

  • In contract theory and economics, information asymmetry deals with the study of decisions in transactions where one party has more or better information than the other.

  • James Fearon in his study of the explanations for war in a game theoretic context notices that war could be a consequence of information asymmetry – two countries will not
    reach a non-violent settlement because they have incentives to distort the amount of military resources they possess.

  • His work with prices as information conveying relative scarcity of goods can be noted as an early form of acknowledging information asymmetry, but with a different name.

  • [21] The idea of information asymmetry has also had a significant effect on management research.

  • [13] 2001 Nobel Prize Inspirations[edit] Information problems have always affected the lives of humans, yet it was not studied with any seriousness until near the 1970s when
    three economists fleshed out models which revolutionized the way we think about information and its interaction with the market.

  • Application in research Accounting and finance[edit] A substantial portion of research in the field of accounting can be framed in terms of information asymmetry, since accounting
    involves the transmission of an enterprise’s information from those who have it to those who need it for decision-making.

  • Alternatively, situations where the buyer usually has better information than the seller include estate sales as specified in a last will and testament, life insurance, or
    sales of old art pieces without a prior professional assessment of their value.

  • [47] • Establish a real-time information announce platform, according to the collect information to achieve market transparency，eliminate trading concerns thereby.

  • The development of contract theory is based on assuming its parties possess different levels of information on the contract’s subject.

  • This idea may be one of the most important in the history and understanding of asymmetric information in economics.

  • In this paper, Akerlof introduced a fundamental concept that certain sellers of used cars have more knowledge than the buyers, and this can lead to what is known as “adverse
    selection”.

  • This cycle repeats until the high-risk policy holders also find similar health policies with cheaper premiums, in which the initial group disappears.

  • An example of monopolies of knowledge is that in some enterprises, only high-level management can fully access the corporate information provided by a third party.

  • [49] Various measures are used to align interest of managers to stop them from abusing their power from information asymmetry such as compensating based on performance using
    a bonus structure.

  • He ultimately concludes that though these economists seemed to have an understanding of the problems of information, they largely did not consider the implications of them,
    and tended to minimize the impact they could have or consider them merely secondary issues.

  • [45] Market impact Zavolokina, Schlegel, and Schwabe (2020) state that Information asymmetry makes buyers and sellers distrust each other, which leads to opportunistic behaviour
    and may even lead to complete break down of the market.

  • It challenges the theorem as one of the key assumptions is that investors would have the same information as a corporation.

  • An example of this could be when a used car is sold, the seller is likely to have a much better understanding of the car’s condition and hence its market value than the buyer,
    who can only estimate the market value based on the information provided by the seller and their own assessment of the vehicle.

  • For instance, when the agent has not gathered information at the outset, does it make a difference whether or not he learns the information later on, before production starts?

  • [46] At the same time, lower quality provision in markets is also one of the consequences, as sellers do not get benefits enough to cover their production costs of providing
    higher quality products.

  • This results in a market failure purely driven by information asymmetry, as under perfect information, all cars can be sold according to their quality.

  • He believes there are two crucial things to consider: first, the incentives, and second, the mechanisms for overcoming information asymmetry.

  • One of those instruments that can be used to reduce the information asymmetry between market participants is intermediary market institutions called counteracting institutions,
    for instance, guarantees for goods.

  • When the level of information asymmetry and associated monitoring cost is high, firms tend to rely less on board monitoring and more on incentive alignment.

  • [54] Contract theory[edit] Contract theory provides insights into how various economic agents can enter contractual arrangements in situation of unequal levels of information.

  • [48] For instance aggressively recognising revenue can result in preparers of financial statements having a much better understanding of the levels of future revenue then
    those reading the statements.

  • Through contract theory, economic agents gain insights on how they can exploit information available to them, to enter beneficial contractua

  • Lastly, mass surveillance helps the political and industrial leaders to amass large volumes of information, which is typically not shared with the rest of society.

  • Information gathering Most models in traditional contract theory assume that asymmetric information is exogenously given.

  • • Enhance customer experience by third-party quality checks like providing expert reviews.

  • According to Arrow, the doctor relies on the social obligation of trust to sell their services to the public, even though the patients do not or cannot inspect the quality
    of a doctor’s work.

  • [24] Monopolies of Knowledge[edit] Main article: monopolies of knowledge In the model of monopolies of knowledge, the ignorant party has no right to access all the critical
    information about a situation for decision-making.

  • Some asymmetric information models can also be used in situations where at least one party can enforce, or effectively retaliate for breaches of, certain parts of an agreement,
    whereas the other(s) cannot.

  • [9] Information asymmetries are studied in the context of principal–agent problems where they are a major cause of misinforming and is essential in every communication process.

  • When buying health insurance, the buyer is not always required to provide full details of future health risks.

  • These mechanisms also let owners of high-quality products get the full value of the goods.

  • He ties it back to the nature of each individual having information that others do not.

  • The study of Mavlanova, Benbunan-Fich and Koufaris (2012) also confirmed that signal usage is different between low-quality and high-quality online sellers.

  • [35][36] Yet, some authors have also studied contract-theoretic models in which asymmetric information arises endogenously because agents decide whether or not to gather information.

  • Private firms have better information than regulators about the actions that they would take in the absence of regulation, and the effectiveness of a regulation may be undermined.

  • This idea was initially studied in the context of matching in the job market.

  • Stiglitz’s work in this area referred to the market for insurance, which is rife with information asymmetry problems to be studied.

  • Regulators can thus take active measures to facilitate the spread of information.

  • [16] Impact of 2001 Nobel Work[edit] These three economists’ simple yet revolutionary work birthed a movement in economics that changed how the field viewed the market forever.

  • Second, Arrow studied the business models of insurance companies and noted that higher-risk individuals are pooled with lower-risk individuals, but both are covered at the
    same cost.

  • [32] Mandatory information disclosure[edit] Both signaling and screening resemble voluntary information disclosure, where the party having more information, for their own
    best interest, use various measures to inform the other party.

  • Blogging on financial websites provides bottom-up communication among investors, analysts, journalists, and academics, as financial blogs help prevent people in charge from
    withholding financial information from their company and the general public.

  • [4] In adverse selection models, the ignorant party lacks of has differing information while negotiating an agreed understanding of or contract to the transaction.

  • Last, he notes how this unique relationship demands that high levels of education and certification be attained by doctors in order to maintain the quality of medical service
    provided by doctors.

  • As a result, many people not willing to risk getting ripped off will avoid certain types of purchases or will not spend as much for a given item.

  • Essentially, this involves the customers returning a defective product regardless of circumstances within a certain time period.

  • Other market mechanisms that help reduce the imbalance in information include brand names, chains and franchising that guarantee the buyer a threshold quality level.

  • George Akerlof’s paper The Market for Lemons[4] introduced a model to help explain a variety of market outcomes when quality is uncertain.

  • [43][44] Sources Information asymmetry within societies can be created and maintained in several ways.

  • Akerlof extends the model to explain other phenomena: Why raising the insurance price cannot facilitate seniors getting medical insurance?

  • believe] about each other’s armaments, quality of military personnel and tactics, determination, geography, political climate, or even just about the relative probability
    of different outcomes” or where they have “incomplete information about the motivations of other agents”.

  • Here each player will have no information of each other’s move while making decisions.

  • [30] Akerlof also suggests different methods with which information asymmetry can be reduced.

  • [50] Effect of blogging[edit] The effect of blogging as a source of information asymmetry as well as a tool reduce asymmetric information has also been well studied.

  • [22] Models Information asymmetry models assume one party possesses some information that other parties have no access to.

  • When the seller has more or better information, the transaction will more likely occur in the seller’s favour (“the balance of power has shifted to the seller”).

  • For instance, in a road construction contract, a civil engineer may have more information on the various inputs required to undertake the project, than the other parties.

  • He noted how other economists have referred to gaining information as a transaction cost.

  • [3] A common way to visualise information asymmetry is with a scale, with one side being the seller and the other the buyer.

  • By providing a guarantee, the buyer in the transaction can use extra time to obtain the same amount of information about the good as the seller before the buyer takes on the
    complete risk of the good being a “lemon”.

 

Works Cited

[‘1. Charles Wilson (2008). “adverse selection,” The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd Edition. Abstract.
2. ^ Jump up to:a b Dembe, Allard E. and Boden, Leslie I. (2000). “Moral Hazard: A Question of Morality?” New Solutions 2000 10(3). 257–79
3. ^
John O. Ledyard (2008). “market failure,” The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Ed. Abstract.
4. ^ Jump up to:a b c Akerlof, George A. (1970-08-01). “The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics. 84 (3): 488–500. doi:10.2307/1879431. ISSN 0033-5533. JSTOR 1879431. S2CID 6738765.
5. ^ Jump up to:a b Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963). “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care”. American Economic Review. American Economic
Association. 53 (5): 941–973. JSTOR 1812044.
6. ^ Fullerton, Don; Wolfram, Catherine (13 May 2010). The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy (PDF). Chicago Illinois: University of Chicago Press. p. 11. ISBN 9780226269146. Retrieved 9
March 2019.
7. ^ Jackson & Morelli 2011, pp. 35, 40–43.
8. ^ Ikenberry 1999, p. 128.
9. ^ Jackson & Morelli 2011, pp. 40, 42.
10. ^ Christozov D., Chukova S., Mateev P., Chapter 11. Informing Processes, Risks, Evaluation of the Risk of Misinforming,
in Foundations of Informing Science, ISI, 2009, pp. 323–356
11. ^ “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2001”. NobelPrize.org. Retrieved 2020-03-07.
12. ^ “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences
in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1996”. NobelPrize.org. Retrieved 2020-11-19.
13. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f g Rosser, J. Barkley Jr. (2003-01-01). “A Nobel Prize for Asymmetric Information: The economic contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and
Joseph Stiglitz”. Review of Political Economy. 15 (1): 3–21. doi:10.1080/09538250308445. ISSN 0953-8259. S2CID 154549764.
14. ^ “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2001: Information for the Public”, press
release from the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Nobel Foundation, nobelprize.org, October 2001, accessed November 12, 2007.
15. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Spence, Michael (August 1973). “Job Market Signaling”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 87
(3): 355–374. doi:10.2307/1882010. ISSN 0033-5533. JSTOR 1882010.
16. ^ Jump up to:a b Rothschild, Michael, and Stiglitz, Joseph. 1976. “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information.” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 90, no. 4: 629.
17. ^ Sandmar, Agmo. 1999. “Asymmetric Information and Public Economics: The Mirrlees-Vickrey Nobel Prize.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, no. 1: 165.
18. ^ Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf, Torsten Persson,
and Jörgen W. Weibull. 2002. “Markets with Asymmetric Information: The Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz.” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104, no. 2: 195–211
19. ^ Akerlof, George A.; Yellen, Janet L. (1985-01-01).
“A Near-Rational Model of the Business Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 100 (Supplement): 823–838. doi:10.1093/qje/100.Supplement.823. ISSN 0033-5533.
20. ^ Stigler, George J. (1961-06-01). “The Economics
of Information”. Journal of Political Economy. 69 (3): 213–225. doi:10.1086/258464. ISSN 0022-3808. S2CID 222441709.
21. ^ Riley, John G. (June 2001). “Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling”. Journal of Economic Literature.
39 (2): 432–478. doi:10.1257/jel.39.2.432. ISSN 0022-0515.
22. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e Bergh, Donald D.; Ketchen, David J.; Orlandi, Ilaria; Heugens, Pursey P. M. A. R.; Boyd, Brian K. (2018-09-21). “Information Asymmetry in Management Research:
Past Accomplishments and Future Opportunities”. Journal of Management. 45 (1): 122–158. doi:10.1177/0149206318798026. ISSN 0149-2063. S2CID 150012600.
23. ^ Dranove, David (2011-01-01), Pauly, Mark V.; Mcguire, Thomas G.; Barros, Pedro P. (eds.),
Chapter Ten – Health Care Markets, Regulators, and Certifiers, Handbook of Health Economics, vol. 2, Elsevier, pp. 639–690, doi:10.1016/B978-0-444-53592-4.00010-4, retrieved 2022-05-03
24. ^ Cordella, T., & Yeyati, E. L. (2003). Bank bailouts: moral
hazard vs. value effect. Journal of Financial intermediation, 12(4), 300-330.
25. ^ Innis, Harold. (1951) The Bias of Communication. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 179-180.
26. ^ Johannes Hörne (2008). “signalling and screening” The
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract.
27. ^ Zhu, Xufeng; Zhang, Chao (2012). “Reducing information asymmetry in the power industry: Mandatory and voluntary information disclosure regulations of sulphur dioxide emission”. Energy
Policy. 45: 704–713. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.03.024.
28. ^ Ross, Sean. “How can the problem of asymmetric information be overcome?”. Investopedia. Retrieved 2021-04-26.
29. ^ Mavlanova, Tamilla; Benbunan-Fich, Raquel; Koufaris, Marios (2012-07-01).
“Signaling theory and information asymmetry in online commerce”. Information & Management. 49 (5): 240–247. doi:10.1016/j.im.2012.05.004. ISSN 0378-7206.
30. ^ Cutler, David M.; Zeckhauser, Richard J. (1998). “Adverse Selection in Health Insurance”
(PDF). Forum for Health Economics & Policy. 1 (1). doi:10.2202/1558-9544.1056.
31. ^ Loomba, Arvinder P.S. (June 1998). “Evolution of product warranty: a chronological study”. Journal of Management History (Archive). 4 (2): 124–136. doi:10.1108/13552529810219601.
ISSN 1355-252X.
32. ^ Ross, Sean. “How can the problem of asymmetric information be overcome?”. Investopedia. Retrieved 2021-04-26.
33. ^ Eleswarapu, Venkat R.; Thompson, Rex; Venkataraman, Kumar (2012). “The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure:
Trading Costs and Information Asymmetry”. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 39 (2): 209–225. doi:10.1017/S0022109000003045. JSTOR 30031853. S2CID 54649344.
34. ^ Eisenhardt K. M. 1989. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy
of Management Review, 14: 57-74.
35. ^ Baron, David P.; Myerson, Roger B. (1982). “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs”. Econometrica. 50 (4): 911–930. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.407.6185. doi:10.2307/1912769. JSTOR 1912769.
36. ^ Maskin, Eric; Riley,
John (1984). “Monopoly with Incomplete Information”. The RAND Journal of Economics. 15 (2): 171. doi:10.2307/2555674. ISSN 0741-6261. JSTOR 2555674.
37. ^ Cremer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad (1992). “Gathering Information before Signing a Contract”.
American Economic Review. 82 (3): 566–578.
38. ^ Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles (1998a). “Contracts and Productive Information Gathering”. Games and Economic Behavior. 25 (2): 174–193. doi:10.1006/game.1998.0651. ISSN 0899-8256.
39. ^
Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013). “Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study”. Review of Economic Studies. 80 (4): 1516–1544. doi:10.1093/restud/rdt010.
40. ^ Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick
W. (2010). “The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures”. Economics Letters. 107 (1): 58–62. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.026. ISSN 0165-1765.
41. ^ Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet,
Jean-Charles (1998b). “Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered”. Journal of Economic Theory. 81 (1): 163–200. doi:10.1006/jeth.1998.2415. ISSN 0022-0531.
42. ^ Hoppe, Eva I. (2013). “Observability of information acquisition
in agency models”. Economics Letters. 119 (1): 104–107. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.015. ISSN 0165-1765.
43. ^ Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013). “Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information
gathering” (PDF). The RAND Journal of Economics. 44 (1): 56–74. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12010. ISSN 0741-6261.
44. ^ Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Shin, Dongsoo (2006). “Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation?”. Journal
of Economics & Management Strategy. 15 (2): 457–478. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.186.157. doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00107.x. ISSN 1058-6407. S2CID 154686412.
45. ^ The tools used to create information asymmetries are described in the following article http://ssrn.com/abstract=2383166
46. ^
Zavolokina, Liudmila; Schlegel, Manuel; Schwabe, Gerhard (2020-02-18). “How can we reduce information asymmetries and enhance trust in ‘The Market for Lemons’?”. Information Systems and E-Business Management. 19 (3): 883–908. doi:10.1007/s10257-020-00466-4.
ISSN 1617-9846. S2CID 213260199.
47. ^ Abito, Jose Miguel; Salant, Yuval (2018-09-04). “The Effect of Product Misperception on Economic Outcomes: Evidence from the Extended Warranty Market”. The Review of Economic Studies. 86 (6): 2285–2318. doi:10.1093/restud/rdy045.
ISSN 0034-6527.
48. ^ Bartov, Eli; Bodnar, Gordon M. (1996). “Alternative Accounting Methods, Information Asymmetry and Liquidity: Theory and Evidence”. The Accounting Review. 71 (3): 397–418. ISSN 0001-4826. JSTOR 248295.
49. ^ Cai, Jie; Qian,
Yiming; Yu, Miaomiao (2015). “Information asymmetry and corporate governance”. The Quarterly Journal of Finance. 05 (3). doi:10.1142/S2010139215500147.
50. ^ Garmaise, M. & G. Natividad (2010). “Information, the Cost of Credit, and Operational Efficiency:
An Empirical Study of Microfinance”. Review of Financial Studies. 23 (6): 2560–2590. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq021.
51. ^ Saxton, Gregory D. (3 August 2008). “Financial blogs and information asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders”. Annual Meeting
of the American Accounting Association.
52. ^ Saxton, G. D. and A. E. Anker (2013). “The Aggregate Effects of Decentralized Knowledge Production: Financial Bloggers and Information Asymmetries in the Stock Market.” Journal of Communication 63(6):
1054–1069.
53. ^ Wilkinson, Nick (2005-05-05). Managerial Economics: A Problem-Solving Approach (1 ed.). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810534.015. ISBN 978-0-521-81993-0.
54. ^ Fearon, James D. (1995). “Rationalist Explanations
for War”. International Organization. 49 (3): 379–414. doi:10.1017/S0020818300033324. ISSN 0020-8183. JSTOR 2706903. S2CID 38573183.
55. ^ Jump up to:a b Lambert, R., Leuz, C., & Verrecchia., 2012. Information Asymmetry, Information Precision and
the Cost of Capital. Review of Finance, 16(1), pp. 1-29.
56. ^ Marwala, Tshilidzi; Hurwitz, Evan (2017). Artificial Intelligence and Economic Theory: Skynet in the Market. London: Springer. ISBN 978-3-319-66104-9.
57. ^ “Artificial Intelligence
can Reduce Information Asymmetry : Networks Course blog for INFO 2040/CS 2850/Econ 2040/SOC 2090”. Retrieved 2020-03-01.
58. ^ Makadok, Richard (September 2011). Barney, Jay B.; Ketchen, David J.; Wright, Mike (eds.). “Invited Editorial: The Four
Theories of Profit and Their Joint Effects”. Journal of Management. 37 (5): 1316–1334. doi:10.1177/0149206310385697. ISSN 0149-2063. S2CID 144052666.
59. ^ Schmidt, Jens; Keil, Thomas (2013-04-01). “What Makes a Resource Valuable? Identifying the
Drivers of Firm-Idiosyncratic Resource Value”. Academy of Management Review. 38 (2): 206–228. doi:10.5465/amr.2010.0404. ISSN 0363-7425.
60. ^ Ozmel, Umit; Reuer, Jeffrey J.; Gulati, Ranjay (2012-07-24). “Signals across Multiple Networks: How Venture
Capital and Alliance Networks Affect Interorganizational Collaboration”. Academy of Management Journal. 56 (3): 852–866. doi:10.5465/amj.2009.0549. ISSN 0001-4273.
61. ^ Dutton, J. E., Ashford, S. J., O’neill, R. M., Hayes, E., & Wierba, E. E. (1997).
Reading the wind: How middle managers assess the context for selling issues to top managers. Strategic management journal, 18(5), 407-423.
62. ^ Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (2001). Decoupling policy from practice: The case of stock repurchase
programs. Administrative science quarterly, 46(2), 202-228.
63. ^ Brush, T. H., & Artz, K. W. (1999). Toward a contingent resource‐based theory: the impact of information asymmetry on the value of capabilities in veterinary medicine. Strategic Management
Journal, 20(3), 223-250.
64. ^ Jump up to:a b Wiktor, Jan W.; Sanak-Kosmowska, Katarzyna (2021-09-30). Information Asymmetry in Online Advertising. London: Routledge. pp. 45–47. doi:10.4324/9781003134121. ISBN 978-1-003-13412-1. S2CID 238682686.
65. ^
McQuail, Denis (2005). Mass communication theory. Sage. ISBN 1-4129-0372-6. OCLC 1151855593.
66. ^ Jump up to:a b Sanak-Kosmowska, Katarzyna; Wiktor, Jan W. (17 October 2020). “Empirical Identification of Latent Classes in the Assessment of Information
Asymmetry and Manipulation in Online Advertising”. Sustainability. 12 (20): 8693. doi:10.3390/su12208693. ISSN 2071-1050.
2. Aboody, David; Lev, Baruch (2000). “Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains”. Journal of Finance. 55 (6): 2747–2766.
doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00305.
3. Akerlof, George A. (1970). “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 84 (3): 488–500. doi:10.2307/1879431. JSTOR 1879431. S2CID 6738765.
4. Bartov,
Eli; Bodnar, Gordon M. (1996). “Alternative Accounting Methods, Information Asymmetry and Liquidity: Theory and Evidence”. The Accounting Review. 71 (3): 397–418. JSTOR 248295 – via JSTOR.
5. Brown, Stephen; Hillegeist, Stephen; Lo, Kin (2004).
“Conference calls and information asymmetry”. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 37 (3): 343–366. doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.02.001.
6. Hayes, Beth (1984). “Unions and Strikes with Asymmetric Information” (PDF). Journal of Labor Economics. [University
of Chicago Press, Society of Labor Economists, NORC at the University of Chicago]. 2 (1): 57–83. doi:10.1086/298023. hdl:10419/220907. JSTOR 2535017. S2CID 154864920.
7. Ikenberry, G. John (1999). “Causes of War: Power and the Roots of International
Conflict by Stephen Van Evers”. Foreign Affairs. 78 (4): 128–9. doi:10.2307/20049381. JSTOR 20049381.
8. Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R. (2007). “The impact of quality uncertainty without asymmetric information on market efficiency”.
Journal of Business Research. 60 (8): 858–867. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.412.9956. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.02.010. ISSN 0148-2963.
9. Jackson, Matthew O.; Morelli, Massimo (2011). “The Reasons for Wars – an Updated Survey”. In Coyne, Chris J.; Mathers,
Rachel L. (eds.). The Handbook on the Political Economy of War. Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 34–57. ISBN 978-1849808323.
10. Koehler, Benedikt (2020). “Thomas Aquinas on the conduct of sales”. Economic Affairs. 40 (3): 358–366. doi:10.1111/ecaf.12436.
S2CID 229017093.
11. Mas-Colell, Andreu; Whinston, Michael D.; Green, Jerry R. (1995). Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-507340-9. (Chaps. 13 and 14 discuss applications of adverse selection and moral hazard
models to contract theory.)
12. Mavlanova, Tamilla; Benbunan-Fich, Raquel; Koufaris, Marios (2012). “Signaling theory and information asymmetry in online commerce”. Information & Management. 49 (5): 240–247. doi:10.1016/j.im.2012.05.004 – via Elsevier.
13. Saxton,
Gregory; Anker, Ashley (2013). “The Aggregate Effects of Decentralized Knowledge Production: Financial Bloggers and Information Asymmetries in the Stock Market”. Journal of Communication. Wiley Subscription Services, Inc. 63 (6): 1054–1069. doi:10.1111/jcom.12060.
S2CID 154672974.
14. Spence, Michael (1973). “Job Market Signaling”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. The MIT Press. 87 (3): 355–374. doi:10.2307/1882010. JSTOR 1882010.
15. Stigler, George J. (1961). “The Economics of Information”. Journal of
Political Economy. University of Chicago Press. 69 (3): 213–225. doi:10.1086/258464. JSTOR 1829263. S2CID 222441709.
Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/deborah_s_perspective/14099204939/’]